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The literature on developmental synesthesia has seen numerous sensory combinations,
with surprisingly few reports on synesthesias involving affect. On the one hand, emotion,
or more broadly affect, might be of minor importance to the synesthetic experience
(e.g., Sinke et al., 2012). On the other hand, predictions on how affect could be
relevant to the synesthetic experience remain to be formulated, in particular those
that are driven by emotion theories. In this theoretical paper, we hypothesize that a
priori studies on synesthesia involving affect will observe the following. Firstly, the
synesthetic experience is not merely about discrete emotion processing or overall valence
(positive, negative) but is determined by or even altered through cognitive appraisal
processes. Secondly, the synesthetic experience changes temporarily on a quantitative
level according to (i) the affective appraisal of the inducing stimulus or (ii) the current
affective state of the individual. These hypotheses are inferred from previous theoretical
and empirical accounts on synesthesia (including the few examples involving affect),
different emotion theories, crossmodal processing accounts in synesthetes, and non-
synesthetes, and the presumed stability of the synesthetic experience. We hope that
the current review will succeed in launching a new series of studies on “affective
synesthesias.” We particularly hope that such studies will apply the same creativity in
experimental paradigms as we have seen and still see when assessing and evaluating
“traditional” synesthesias.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE PHENOMENON OR PHENOMENA
The etymology of synesthesia is derived from the Greek syn
meaning “together” and aesthesis meaning “sensation”; which
means literally “union of the senses” (Cytowic, 2002). In this
regard, synesthesia can be understood as a phenomenon wherein
a simultaneous dual perception arises from a single sensory
input (the inducer). The additional percept (the concurrent)
belongs either to the same or to a different sensory modal-
ity. Prevalence studies could show that one of the most fre-
quent forms of synesthesia is grapheme-color synesthesia (Day,
2005; Rich et al., 2005; Simner et al., 2006). In this form, the
perception of an achromatic grapheme (e.g., the letter “p”) is
reported to also trigger the subjective perception of a color
experience with the respective color perception being idiosyn-
cratic to the individual (e.g., the color “orange”). In some cases,
this idiosyncratic color experience is accompanied by texture,
shape, and movement qualities (Tyler, 2005). Other forms of
synesthesia include reports that seeing or hearing words, num-
bers, or sounds can activate the simultaneous perception of
smells, tastes, and shapes (Cytowic, 2002; Ward and Simner,
2003; Tyler, 2005). Yet, there seem to be countless types of
possible synesthetic experiences such as the combinations of
time and space (Price and Mentzoni, 2008; Smilek et al., 2010),
vision and touch (Banissy and Ward, 2007; Banissy et al., 2009),
sound and touch (Beauchamp and Ro, 2008), observing pain
in others and feeling this pain oneself (Fitzgibbon et al., 2010),
and the attribution of animate-like qualities (e.g., personality,
gender) to sequential linguistic units (e.g., letters, numerals)
(Simner and Holenstein, 2007).
Reports on synesthesia have existed for centuries (Galton,
1880; Flournoy, 1892; Jewanski et al., 2009). Scientific activities
have occurred in waves such as the one around the turn of the
last century (Alford, 1918; Mahling, 1926) and a more recent
one with the renaissance of the study of cognition (Marks, 1975).
Since then, researchers accumulated evidence for the genuineness
of the idiosyncratic synesthetic experience (Rich and Mattingley,
2002) using well-established cognitive paradigms (e.g., the Stroop
paradigm) and neuroimaging methods. Despite small sample
sizes, many of these carefully designed studies were accepted for
publication in highly prestigious journals (Dixon et al., 2000;
Beeli et al., 2005). Today, the prevalence rate of synesthesia is
estimated to be comparable in both sexes and to be evident in
around 4% of the population (Ward and Simner, 2005; Simner
et al., 2006). This relatively high prevalence rate together with
the description of and search for (i) individual differences in the
synesthetic experience (Dixon et al., 2004; Skelton et al., 2009;
Rouw and Scholte, 2010), (ii) cognitive correlates (Azoulai et al.,
2005; Yaro and Ward, 2007; Rothen and Meier, 2009; Banissy
et al., 2011; Ward, 2013), and (iii) personality and clinical corre-
lates (Bors, 1979; Forsman, 1993; Ro et al., 2007; Logsdail, 2009;
Banissy et al., 2013) contributed to numerous published group
studies.
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The most studied and thus the most representative type of
synesthesia is the developmental one (also known as constitu-
tional, idiopathic or strong synesthesia) (Grossenbacher, 1997;
Harrison and Baron-Cohen, 1997; Martino and Marks, 2001).
Important to this form is that the experience is present from early
childhood, automatic, idiosyncratic, and remains supposedly sta-
ble over the course of a lifetime. Apart from the developmental
type of synesthesia, the existence of and relationship between dif-
ferent types of synesthesia are discussed (e.g., Rogowska, 2011;
Sinke et al., 2012; Ward, 2013), in particular those acquired
following particular life events or those affecting the central
nervous system more directly. For instance, synesthetic expe-
riences have been reported in association with migraine auras
(Podoll and Robinson, 2002; Alstadhaug and Benjaminsen, 2010),
post-hypnotic suggestion (Terhune et al., 2010), thalamic lesions
(Beauchamp and Ro, 2008), and drug ingestion (Siebert, 1994;
Sinke et al., 2012). These latter types, however, lack the features
known from the genuine, i.e., developmental, type (automaticity,
stability, idiosyncrasy) (Sinke et al., 2012).
SYNESTHESIAS INVOLVING EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES
In their comprehensive comparison of developmental, acquired
and drug-induced synesthesias, Sinke et al. (2012) discuss inter-
esting phenomenological differences. For instance, external sen-
sory input is the common inducer of developmental synesthesias
(vision, audition, touch) with body-related sensory input play-
ing no such role. The authors (as well as the current authors) are
unaware of a reported case of synesthesia for which propriocep-
tive or vestibular information was accompanied by a concurrent
synesthetic experience. Pain however does seem implicated in
synesthetic experiences (Dudycha andDudycha, 1935; Fitzgibbon
et al., 2010). In one case, a person reports that “each type of
pain always gives rise to the same photism with its characteris-
tic form, color or brightness” (p. 58) and varies with the extent of
pain (Dudycha and Dudycha, 1935). The same synesthete reports
that for dull and throbbing pains, the photism “varies in size and
seems to correspond exactly with the affected part” (p. 59). In
another case of synesthesia for pain, the respective person reports
to empathize with another person’s pain and to experience the
observed pain, or even the imagined pain, as if it was the own
(Bradshaw, 2001; Giummarra and Bradshaw, 2009; Fitzgibbon
et al., 2010). Thus, although proprioceptive and vestibular sen-
sory experiences do not seem related to synesthetic experiences,
bodily experiences may be related—in particular those with an
affective component (own pain or observation of other’s pain).
This latter observation is important when now commenting on
affectivity (Sinke et al., 2012).
On page 1426, Sinke et al. (2012) write about the affectiv-
ity of synesthetic experiences. The overall conclusion was that
“in genuine synesthesia, the impact of affectivity is low.” The
authors state that in developmental synesthesia the content of
the synesthetic experience (i) is commonly not affective or emo-
tional in itself, and (ii) is not influenced by current affective or
emotional state. Surely, it has been noted anecdotally and exper-
imentally that affective experiences may occur as a secondary
effect. For example, an early report (Alford, 1918) describes a
synesthete who gave up music because the respective synesthetic
experiences were disturbing. Recent studies report that synes-
thetes react with feelings of “correctness” or “pleasantness” to
experiences in which the synesthetic and actual perceived fea-
tures of a stimulus match (e.g., a grapheme is presented in its
synesthetically matching color) and react with feelings of “incor-
rectness” or “unpleasantness” in the case of mismatches (e.g., a
grapheme is presented in a synesthetically non-matching color)
(Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a; Cytowic, 2002; Callejas
et al., 2007). Such subjective experiences yielded psychophysio-
logical correlates (Hochel et al., 2009).
Additional reports would support the possibility that affect is
indeed an important sensory experience to developmental synes-
thesia, and can be so in three possible ways. The affective com-
ponent is (1) the trigger or inducer (Cutsforth, 1925; Dudycha
and Dudycha, 1935; Fitzgibbon et al., 2010), (2) the concurrent
(Ramachandran and Brang, 2008; Ramachandran et al., 2012),
or (3) neither the inducer nor the direct concurrent, but a mod-
erator or mediator of the synesthetic coupling (Cytowic, 1989;
Emrich et al., 2004; Ward, 2004; Simner and Holenstein, 2007;
Hochel et al., 2009; Ramachandran et al., 2012). For instance,
reactions to words of affective valence as well as to personally
known faces triggered emotionally mediated color synesthesia
(Ward, 2004). This author replicated previous reports that darker
and less saturated colors (e.g., brown, black) tend to be associ-
ated with negative emotions and lighter andmore saturated colors
(e.g., yellow, green, red) tend to be associated with positive emo-
tions (p. 770). In another single case study, independent authors
reported that “Pleasing pictures and faces were typically red to
R, while repulsive visuals or unpleasant human faces elicited a
pale green color in R’s mind’s eye” (Hochel et al., 2009; p. 705).
In other cases, feeling particular textures triggered specific emo-
tions (Ramachandran and Brang, 2008), and emotional situations
triggered the synesthetic experience of color (Cutsforth, 1925).
Synesthetes are also known for liking or disliking certain letters
based on their apparent “personality”—a synesthetic form coined
“ordinal linguistic personification” in which letters have a gender,
personality, and emotional connotation (Simner and Holenstein,
2007; Smilek et al., 2007). Moreover, overall affective judgment
of colors was influenced by the emotional coherence between the
stimulus and photism (Hochel et al., 2009). Finally, a synesthete
with a diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome better understood his
and other persons’ emotions when he could associate them to a
particular color (Ramachandran et al., 2012).
These reports would suggest that synesthesias involving affect
or even concrete emotions are indeed thinkable, and might, as
will be argued in the following, imply facets little considered
so far. This argumentation will firstly return to the relevance
of physical experiences to emotion, before discussing cognitive
appraisal in emotion elicitation, the difference between emo-
tion and affect, crossmodal interactions in non-synesthetes, and
dynamic changes of sensory experiences with the perceivers’ emo-
tional and affective states. Subsequently, we will briefly mention
some studies and reports that question the stability and durabil-
ity of the synesthetic as well as crossmodal experience. Finally, we
will conclude that some synesthetic experiences might change in
quality or rather in quantity with ongoing emotional and affective
states.
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THE ROLE OF NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL EXPERIENCES AND
COGNITIVE APPRAISAL IN EMOTION THEORIES
Emotion researchers frequently disagree on what constitutes an
emotion (Scherer, 2005; Mulligan and Scherer, 2012). Historical
traditions (James, 1890; Schachter, 1964) and contemporary
emotion theories (for example Cacioppo et al., 2000) agree that
neurophysiological (e.g., respiratory, cardiac) changes are cru-
cial to emotion processing (for a review, see Kreibig, 2010). Such
changes are considered essential to mobilize an organism (e.g., a
human) to respond effectively to a given situation. For instance,
back in my neighborhood, I am driving around in my car to
find a parking space. In front of me, I suddenly see a ball that is
rolling onto the street. In this situation, most people are quickly
alarmed, experiencing neurophysiological changes that prepare
them for action such as to brake hard to avoid the moving object.
Our heart rate might increase, our breathing becomes faster and
our hands are getting sweaty. The activated peripheral subsystems
(cardiovascular, respiratory, electrodermal) respond instantly to
situations of potential danger. Yet, the potential danger is not only
about the rolling ball, but also about the possibility that a person,
perhaps a child, suddenly appears running behind the ball. This
possibility, however, goes beyond the perception of the actual sit-
uation, it relates to our knowledge of the world and our appraisal
of the situation. Indeed, our neurophysiological changes might
be particularly strong because hitting the imagined child is much
more worrisome than hitting the ball. Thus, the emotional expe-
rience is the result of situational elaboration or appraisal, rather
than the mere processing of sensory input.
In this regard, it is important to mention that such neuro-
physiological changes do not sufficiently explain the full emotion
process. Firstly, most neurophysiological changes are not specific
to a given emotion. Second, the same neurophysiological changes
do not necessarily lead to the same subjectively experienced emo-
tion or behavioral response (Cacioppo et al., 2000). While our
ball scenario indicated possible danger resulting in a fear or
alarm reaction, similar activations of peripheral subsystems (car-
diovascular, respiratory, electrodermal) can also accompany the
experience of anger (Kreibig, 2010). The latter may occur when
one circles around one’s neighborhood without finding a free
parking space. Needless to say, the fear reaction is subjectively
quite unlike the anger reaction despite both being about obstruct-
ing events. It has long been understood that the activation of the
sympathetic nervous system prepares the organism for both fight
and flight responses (Cannon, 1929; Bradley and Lang, 2000).
Neurophysiological changes might thus be necessary to have emo-
tional experiences and reactions, but they are largely emotion
unspecific. Also, the same emotion can be associated with dif-
ferent patterns of neurophysiological changes (Cacioppo et al.,
2000).
Crucial is the way an individual cognitively processes a situa-
tion that leads to a behavioral response. When seeing that a ball is
rolling onto the street, one individual might speed up to quickly
pass the scene of potential danger, while another might brake hard
to avoid reaching the scene of potential danger. Also, the lack of a
parking space may facilitate an anger response when the driver is
in a hurry, and especially so when the driver blames someone else
(a badly parked car occupies two parking spaces). Thus, the same
event might trigger different emotional experiences and behav-
iors both between individuals and within individuals at different
time points depending on how the individual appraises the event.
“Because appraisals intervene between situations and emotions,
different individuals who appraise the same situation in significantly
different ways will feel different emotions; and a given individual
who appraises the same situation in significantly different ways at
different times will feel different emotions” (Roseman and Smith,
2001; p. 6).
Accordingly, emotions are not “simple” sensory experiences of
neurophysiological change, but involve cognitive processes con-
tributing to the elicitation, differentiation, and regulation of emo-
tions (Moors, 2009). Emotions are not directed toward random
events or objects. On the contrary, emotional reactions are mainly
intentional in that they are directed toward or are about some-
thing specific: I am afraid of hitting the child, I am angry at the
driver blocking two parking spaces, etc. Emotional intentional-
ity implies again that a given situation or object has gone through
some form of prior evaluation, however, minimal. Indeed, in cog-
nitive appraisal accounts (e.g., Scherer, 2001), appraisals range
from low level relevance detection (e.g., the rolling ball as a sud-
den and novel stimulus demanding attention) to higher level goal
congruency processing (e.g., lack of parking spaces as an obstacle
to relax at home after a demanding working day), coping poten-
tial (e.g., evaluating the time needed to stop the car before hitting
a potentially appearing child), to the very high level evaluation of
the social context with respect to personal and cultural standards
(e.g., social evaluation if having hit a playing child) (for reviews,
see Roseman and Smith, 2001; Moors, 2009).
Importantly, cognitive appraisal theories would speak against
a widely held assumption of modularity in emotion processing
such as in discrete emotion theories (Ekman, 1992). Modularity
here indicates that an emotion might represent a unique and
discrete response pattern that was triggered by a specific affect
program, established evolutionarily. This modularity was sug-
gested for prototypical or basic emotions of anger, fear, sadness,
disgust, and happiness (Ekman, 1999). For instance, fear would be
processed by a discrete neural network in the same way as vision
or audition would be processed by discrete visual and auditory
neural networks, respectively (Ohman and Mineka, 2001). The
above mentioned appraisal rationale would, however, imply that
emotional experiences and responses are not simply the result of
modular processes that are automatically elicited by the objective
properties of a given event or object. Rather, emotional experi-
ences and responses would result from an individual’s situational
appraisal of a given situation. The quality (type) and quantity
(intensity) of the experiences are likely characterized by non-
specific neurophysiological changes in conjunction with specific
event appraisals.
Acknowledging the relevance of such cognitive appraisal
mechanisms, we equally acknowledge the possibility that these
mechanisms lead to systematic differences in the synesthetic expe-
rience. In other words, the fact that the same stimulus can
lead to qualitatively and quantitatively different affective expe-
riences both within and across individuals may contribute to a
potential dynamism of the synesthetic experience (see below).
Moreover, the inconsistency with which objective properties of
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specific stimuli and events are linked with subjective affective
experiences may have led to an underestimation of the preva-
lence of emotional synesthesias. The emotion literature would
point toward consistent couplings of affective experiences to a
synesthete’s appraisal of the stimulus. For instance, Ward (2004)
reported that GW experiences synesthetic colors in response to
different types of stimuli (names of personal acquaintances, emo-
tional words), their connection shaped by personal life experience
and affective (valenced) reactions toward these stimuli. As will be
argued below, such connections, shaped over a lifetime, might be
accompanied by connections that change with a given situation.
Before moving to the following sections, it seems construc-
tive finalizing this section by noting the basic distinction between
emotion and affect. Novices to emotion research tend to meddle
with various concepts important to emotion or affect theories.
Affective scientists, indeed, make very clear distinctions between
affect, emotion, and other affective phenomena. Affect basi-
cally refers to mental states characterized by evaluative feelings.
Affective states represent a broad and overarching collection of
“affective subtypes” such as emotions, moods, attitudes, pref-
erences, interpersonal stances, and affect dispositions (Scherer,
2005). Both psychophysiological reactions and cognitive appraisal
influence the affective experience to different degrees. By infer-
ence, such reactions and appraisals could be relevant to affect-
related or affect-modulated synesthesias. Before considering tem-
porary aspects of these possibilities (stable vs. dynamic affect
relationships), we account for ideas on the origin of synesthesia
because they influence our understanding on how idiosyncratic
and stable synesthesia may occur.
CROSS-WIRING IN SYNESTHESIA AND CROSSMODAL
PROCESSING IN NON-SYNESTHETES
According to aetiological models, synesthetic experiences emerge
from co-activation of otherwise independent sensory, closed
modular systems (Baron-Cohen and Harrison, 1993). This co-
activation might emerge from associative learning (Galton, 1880;
Stevenson et al., 1998) disinhibited feedback (Grossenbacher
and Lovelace, 2001), enhanced neural connectivity (Rouw and
Scholte, 2007; Bargary and Mitchell, 2008), and/or neural cross-
talk (Hubbard and Ramachandran, 2001; Ramachandran and
Hubbard, 2001b, see also Smilek et al., 2001; Ward, 2013).
While none of these models can yet predict in which way these
neuronal correlates lead to synesthetic experiences (Deroy and
Spence, 2013), it has repeatedly been suggested that such forms
of coactivation might also be relevant to crossmodal process-
ing in non-synesthetes (e.g., Simner, 2012 for a recent account,
but see Deroy and Spence, 2013). This suggestion is in line with
independent notions that synesthesia and crossmodal percep-
tion in non-synesthetes might follow a continuum (e.g., Martino
and Marks, 2001; Cohen Kadosh and Terhune, 2012; see also
Deroy and Spence, 2013 for a critical account on this perspective).
Crossmodal mappings common to both synesthetes and non-
synesthetes have indeed been reported such as for pitch-lightness
(Ward et al., 2006), vision-touch and spatial-numeric interactions
(Sagiv and Ward, 2006).
Following this reasoning, and assuming that affective expe-
riences are relevant to the richness of possible crossmodal
experiences (Collier, 1996; Palmer et al., 2013b) (and by infer-
ence synesthetic experiences as well), we would expect for non-
synesthetes (i) that stimuli such as letters, words, numbers, and
sounds go systematically with experiences such as colors, bright-
ness, and shapes (see e.g., Collier and Hubbard, 2004) but also
(ii) that sensory and affective experiences are linked such that
they relate to each other directly, or that sensory experiences are
changed by an individual’s current affective state.
Studies show systematic associations between color and emo-
tion terms in non-synesthetes from different cultural back-
grounds (D’Andrade and Egan, 1974; Johnson et al., 1986; Hupka
et al., 1997). The non-synesthetes in Ward (2004) associated color
brightness and saturation levels with the pleasantness dimension
of emotion, in line with previous findings (Valdez andMehrabian,
1994). Smiling faces appear brighter than non-smiling faces (Song
et al., 2012) and redder faces appear angrier than less red faces
(Yasuda et al., 2007). Palmer et al. (2013b) reported systematic
mappings between stimuli from different modalities in normal
populations. The authors observed significant correlations of
both emotional ratings of faces and musical excerpts with emo-
tional ratings of colors chosen to go best with the faces or musical
excerpts. These correlations were explained by common affective
experiences evoked by or associated with these stimuli. In another
study, systematic associations were shown between emotion terms
and perceptual aspects such as shape, size and direction, color,
music, and sound (Collier, 1996). Collier (p. 30) even concluded
that the innate basis for such “affective synesthesias” in non-
synesthetes, seemingly present in 2 year olds, “would help explain
the universal appeal of the arts.” This conclusion is supported
by reports that crossmodal processing involving affective qualities
and quantities are important to our aesthetic experience (Palmer
et al., 2013a) as well as art production and appreciation (Van
Meel, 1994; Rogowska, 2011).
Of additional interest are studies on the body conveying affect
in art and other abstract forms of expression. For instance, emo-
tion recognition from stylistic dance (e.g., Dittrich et al., 1996)
parallels emotion recognition from non-stylized expressive move-
ment (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2007). Aronoff et al. (1992) observed
that emotional attributions to both ballet movements and sim-
ple geometric forms are associated with similar shape features
(angular and diagonal vs. round) (see Lundqvist et al., 1999
on similar observations for faces). Spatiotemporal cues of arm
and whole body movement (size, fluency, joint angle) convey
expressed or perceived emotion (Pollick et al., 2001; Atkinson
et al., 2007; Visch and Tan, 2009; Dael et al., 2013). Visch and
Tan (2009) found that dynamic movement pattern in abstract
animated objects influenced emotional responses; slow and direct
movement generated sadness, for example, whereas high velocity
movements evoked fear and surprise. In the words of Larson et al.
(2012; p. 410) “emotion can be effectively and implicitly commu-
nicated based on primitive geometric forms that are embedded in
many common affective cues.”
The current section showed that crossmodal correspondences
are not specific to synesthesia, but that crossmodal processing
is common in the general population. For our current purpose,
we here focused on crossmodal processing involving affective
experiences. If synesthesia and crossmodal processing are based
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on a partially overlapping aetiology, more synesthesias should be
observable linking affect and sensory (including bodily) expe-
riences. As indicated above, such published observations are
relatively rare (Cytowic, 1989; Ward, 2004; Callejas et al., 2007;
Ramachandran and Brang, 2008; Hochel et al., 2009; Sinke et al.,
2012) probably because understudied. For future studies, we
would suggest accounting for “emotionality” (discrete emotions,
valence) but to also move beyond such more traditional assess-
ments of emotionality by considering a variety of neurophysi-
ological and spatiotemporal body measures as well as cognitive
appraisal driving affective experiences.
THE STABILITY AND DURABILITY OF SYNESTHETIC
EXPERIENCES QUESTIONED
We have seen that studies on affect in synesthesia dealt with dis-
crete emotions (so far one report to the authors’ knowledge:
Ramachandran and Brang, 2008), affective valence (Ward, 2004),
affective preferences (Callejas et al., 2007), and pain (Dudycha
and Dudycha, 1935). Intuitively, the likely assumption would be
that affective cross-links would be stable, durable and idiosyn-
cratic (but see Ward, 2004), as commonly assumed for cross-
modal experiences in developmental synesthesia. Yet, as will be
shown, synesthetic experiences might disappear, new ones may
develop in later life, and some might depend on the context, with
possibly synesthetic experiences involving affect.
Changes to synesthetic experiences have been suggested since
the beginning of the last century with a potentially higher preva-
lence of synesthesia in children than in adults (Alford, 1918;
Riggs and Karwoski, 1934). Over a 12 months period, new
synesthetic experiences were reported from children between 6
and 8 years old (Simner et al., 2009). As will be shown, new
synesthetic experiences do also occur in later life. These experi-
ences refer to new synesthetic couplings when encountering new
stimuli. For instance, in the case of object personification synes-
thesia, stable personalities are experienced for familiar but also
for novel objects, even after a single encounter (Smilek et al.,
2007). When it comes to lexical material, four individuals out of
192 reported synesthetic experiences when exposed to language
they do not understand (Rich et al., 2005). In addition, these
same authors reported on a synesthete whose mother tongue was
English and who had learned Modern Greek as an adult. This
synesthete showed comparable synesthetic experiences accord-
ing to the shape of the letters in the two different alphabets (as
compared to the letter’s similarity in pronunciation) (see also
Witthoft and Winawer, 2006; Simner et al., 2011 for synesthetic
experiences in different languages). A recent study showed that
it took only a 10-min writing exercise for grapheme-color asso-
ciations to be transferred to novel graphemes, here Glagolitic
letters, characters from an ancient language (Mroczko et al.,
2009).
Although synesthetic experiences are generally stable from
early childhood, there is some evidence to suggest that new cou-
plings can be formed with new stimuli over even short periods
of time, or be mediated by context (encountering new persons,
learning new skills). As noted before, the inducer is not the “phys-
ical” stimulus for the synesthetic experience itself, but how an
object or experience is interpreted (e.g., Simner, 2007). Most of
the time, an object (e.g., letter) is likely interpreted in the same
way and by inference leads to the same concurrent. Yet, as out-
lined above, life situations might be appraised differently across
time leading to potential changes to the synesthetic experience.
If a certain “dynamism” applies to synesthesias involving affect
alike, one might expect changes in the synesthetic experience
with relatively lasting changes to affective measures (e.g., changed
preferences and likings for persons, objects, sounds, activities).
However, as will be considered in the next section, changes in
the synesthetic experience involving affect might also be short
lasting.
TEMPORARY CHANGES TO CROSSMODAL PROCESSING
WHEN INVOLVING AFFECT
The literature on crossmodal processing would hint at relatively
short-lasting changes to synesthetic experiences involving affect.
More specifically, we refer (i) to situations differing in their cur-
rent affect such as the exposure to pleasant or unpleasant sensory
stimulations (e.g., odor, images) and (ii) temporary changes to a
person’s mood (failing exams, break-up of a romantic relation-
ship, death of a kin). While possible synesthetic and crossmodal
links involving affect have been outlined above, we are dealing
here with the possibility that crossmodal experiences change in
quality or quantity as a function of how the individual affec-
tively perceives the sensory experience at the time of testing or
as a function of the affective state the individual is at the time of
testing.
Studies assessed altered sensory perceptions after the manip-
ulation of participants’ affective states typically by comparing
performance after positive/negative mood induction as compared
to a neutral state induction using various materials. Siegel and
Stefanucci (2011), for instance, reported that participants con-
sidered sounds to be significantly louder after a negative mood
induction as compared to participants after a neutral mood
induction. Noise-induced anger biased the perception of red for
an ambiguously colored red-blue computer screen (Fetterman
et al., 2012). Affective word evaluations primed brightness
perceptions of gray squares congruent with the hypothesized
metaphor (negative = dark; positive = light) (Meier et al.,
2007)—a result that was replicated after listening to emotion-
evokingmusical excerpts (Lindsen and Bhattacharya, 2012). Chen
and Dalton (2005) found that anxious individuals and neurotic
individuals detected pleasant and unpleasant odors faster than
neutral odors. Moreover, in men, the intensity of the odors was
perceived to be stronger when being in an emotional (irrespec-
tive of valence) as compared to a neutral state. In another study,
olfactory sensitivity was negatively affected after having seen
unpleasant pictures, although odors were subjectively rated to be
more intense (Pollatos et al., 2007). Thus, affective states seem to
modify sensory experiences temporarily.
Additional studies further strengthen the notion that mod-
ifications can occur for stimuli of varying complexity (e.g.,
primary visual analysis, size estimations, processing of social
cues) and at early or later processing stages (e.g., Phelps et al.,
2006; Bocanegra and Zeelenberg, 2009; Schmitz et al., 2009;
Stefanucci et al., 2011; Rossi and Pourtois, 2013). When relatively
“simple” target features were concerned, brief presentation of a
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fearful face as compared to a neutral one resulted in superior
orientation sensitivity for images of low spatial frequency and
attenuated orientation sensitivity for images of high spatial fre-
quency (Bocanegra and Zeelenberg, 2009). Phelps et al. (2006)
observed enhanced contrast sensitivity for Gabor patches (early
visual processing) subsequent to fear induction. Also, visual field
processing is narrowed when in a negative mood and widened
when in a positive mood (Schmitz et al., 2009; see also Gable and
Harmon-Jones, 2010). In an ERP study, Rossi and Pourtois (2013)
found that effective filtering (perceptual encoding) of peripheral
task-irrelevant distractors was abolished when individuals were
in a negative mood. Another study showed that height is over-
estimated when looking at high vs. low arousing pictures and
that this effect is enhanced when individuals up-regulated their
emotional experience (Stefanucci and Storbeck, 2009). Moreover,
when standing on a skateboard on top of a hill, participants who
were scared as compared to those who were not judged the hill to
be steeper (Stefanucci et al., 2008). Anxious participants whowere
in the dark judged auditory targets to be closer than non-anxious
participants (Gagnon et al., 2013).
When considering “more complex” target features, Anderson
et al. (2011) found that participants having experienced an
unpleasant affect as compared to a neutral situation had a pro-
cessing bias for emotional faces in a binocular rivalry paradigm.
In lexical decision and word naming experiments, emotional
state facilitated responses to words categorically related to the
induced emotion (i.e., happy vs. sad words) (Niedenthal and
Setterlund, 1997). Ferraro et al. (2003) showed that happy and
sad mood inductions (listening to classical music) resulted in
faster responding to happy and sad words, respectively. In another
series of studies, a decreased holistic processing bias for faces has
been reported subsequent to a negative as compared to positive
and neutral mood induction (Curby et al., 2011; see also Lynn
et al., 2012). Yet, questioning the role of valence, when having
undergone an arousal induction procedure, participants yielded
a global vs. local processing bias for geographical map informa-
tion, irrespective of the valence of the arousal situation (Brunyé
et al., 2009).
The current section showed that perception changes as a func-
tion of individuals’ affective state, but also as a function of the
affective properties of the material. If these findings apply to
synesthesia, we could expect to observe slight changes to the
synesthetic experiences in analogy to the observations described
here. Changes are potentially subtle and may only become rec-
ognizable when of sufficient magnitude. The studies reviewed
here would point to quantitative changes rather than qualitative
changes: experiences were larger, closer, darker, steeper and faster.
For synesthetes, one could thus expect short-lasting quantitative
changes such as the synesthetic colors being lighter when in a pos-
itive state (Meier et al., 2007; Lindsen and Bhattacharya, 2012), or
the months being spatially localized more closely when in an anx-
ious state (Gagnon et al., 2013). These predictions on a mainly
quantitative level would also fit with synesthetes’ own experience
that the synesthetic experience remains the same. If synesthetes
would experience major qualitative changes, these would have
certainly been reported (but obviously the possibility should not
be excluded), while quantitative ones might mainly be too subtle
to be overtly recognized as such by the individual (see also Deroy
and Spence, 2013).
In this regard, we would like to finish this section with refer-
ence to a promising report on a synesthete published in 1935 by
Dudycha andDudycha. Among other synesthetic crossmodal cor-
respondences, their participant reported auditory—shape synes-
thesias. When hearing the same person speaking in a rasping
voice, the accompanying shapes would be larger and sharper.
Also, the shapes would be larger with increasing harshness of
the same voice. Here the synesthete was aware of these relation-
ships. The authors write the “subject observes the photism which
is caused by her own speaking voice, and states that whenever
she observes that it is becoming rough or jagged she modu-
lates her voice so as to make the photism smooth and rod-like.”
(p. 63).
CONCLUSIONS
In the current article, we aimed to provide a rationale for the
probable role of affect in developmental synesthesia. We reviewed
the literature on synesthesia (in particular relevant to affective
processing) on the one hand and introduced some general the-
oretical concepts and empirical findings from the emotion and
crossmodal literature on the other hand. The motivation for this
endeavor relates to the relatively minimal attention affect has
received in the published literature on synesthesia. Indeed, the
synesthetic experience might not be affective to the synesthete
who is used to these experiences (Sinke et al., 2012). Yet, when
briefly reviewing the literature on crossmodal processing in synes-
thesia, modular (e.g., on discrete emotions) and non-modular
(e.g., cognitive appraisal) emotion theories, as well as cross-
modal processing (including affect) in the general population,
two major predictions emerged. Firstly, since cognitive appraisal
determines the form and intensity of the affective experience,
it should also to some extent determine potential idiosyncrasies
of or changes to the synesthetic experience. In these cases, the
synesthetic experience involving affect would be relatively long-
lasting if the affective appraisal is likely to remain stable (e.g.,
very unpleasant odors) or might change depending on changes
in affective appraisal (e.g., from liking to disliking of particular
persons). Secondly, synesthesias involving affect might be subject
to temporary changes of relatively short duration according to the
affective evaluation of a stimulus (e.g., a less pleasant odor being
judged more intense) or the current affective state of the individ-
ual (e.g., an anxious person perceives the hill asmore steep). Here,
changes to the synesthetic experience are proposed to be mainly
quantitative rather than qualitative.
We suggest that such future studies might also benefit from
the consideration of appraisal accounts of emotion and affect
(see for example Fontaine et al., 2007) as well as psychological
theories suggesting associative mechanisms by which prior affec-
tive (valenced) experiences with objects or concepts can explain
current preferences (Palmer and Schloss, 2010).
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Development of basic article idea and structure Nele Dael,
Christine Mohr. Literature search, analysis, andwriting Nele Dael,
Guillaume Sierro, Christine Mohr
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 754 | 6
Dael et al. Affect-related synesthesias
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We wish to thank Akzonobel, Imperial Chemical Industries
(ICI) Limited, in particular Dr. David Elliott, Leader
Color R&I team, Slough, UK, for supporting our empir-
ical work on color and emotion links. Without these
recent activities, we would have had fewer opportunities
merging different research expertise, which also fostered
ideas presented in the current manuscript. We are grate-
ful to Christina Györkös for English proofreading of the
manuscript.
REFERENCES
Alford, L. B. (1918). A report
on two cases of synesthesia.
J. Abnorm. Psychol. 13, 1–11. doi:
10.1037/h0075167
Alstadhaug, K., and Benjaminsen, E.
(2010). Synesthesia and migraine:
case report. BMC Neurol. 10:121.
doi: 10.1186/1471-2377-10-121
Anderson, E., Siegel, E. H., and
Barrett, L. F. (2011). What you
feel influences what you see:
the role of affective feelings in
resolving binocular rivalry. J. Exp.
Soc. Psychol. 47, 856–860. doi:
10.1016/j.jesp.2011.02.009
Aronoff, J., Woike, B. A., and Hyman,
M. (1992). Which are the stimuli
in facial displays of anger and
happiness. Configurational bases
of emotion recognition. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 62, 1050–1066. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.62.6.1050
Atkinson, A. P., Tunstall, M. L., and
Dittrich, W. H. (2007). Evidence for
distinct contributions of form and
motion information to the recog-
nition of emotions from body ges-
tures. Cognition 104, 59–72. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2006.05.005
Azoulai, S., Hubbard, E. M., and
Ramachandran, V. S. (2005). “Does
synesthesia contribute to mathe-
matical savant skills?” in Poster
Presented at the Proceedings of the
Cognitive Neuroscience Society (New
York, NY).
Banissy, M. J., Garrido, L., Kusnir,
F., Duchaine, B., Walsh, V., and
Ward, J. (2011). Superior facial
expression, but not identity
recognition, in mirror-touch synes-
thesia. J. Neurosci. 31, 1820–1824.
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5759-
09.2011
Banissy, M. J., Walsh, V., and Ward, J.
(2009). Enhanced sensory percep-
tion in synesthesia. Exp. Brain Res.
196, 565–571. doi: 10.1007/s00221-
009-1888-0
Banissy, M. J., and Ward, J. (2007).
Mirror-touch synaesthesia is linked
with empathy. Nat. Neurosci.
10, 815–816. doi: 10.1038/
nn1926
Banissy, M. J., Holle, H., Cassell,
J., Annett, L., Tsakanikos, E.,
Walsh, V., et al. (2013). Personality
traits in people with synaes-
thesia: do synaesthetes have an
atypical personality profile. Pers.
Individ. Dif. 54, 828–831. doi:
10.1016/j.paid.2012.12.018
Bargary, G., and Mitchell, K. J. (2008).
Synaesthesia and cortical connectiv-
ity. Trends Neurosci. 31, 335–342.
doi: 10.1016/j.tins.2008.03.007
Baron-Cohen, S., and Harrison, J.
(1993). Coloured speech per-
ception: is synaesthesia what
happens when modularity breaks
down. Perception 22, 419–419. doi:
10.1068/p220419
Beauchamp, M. S., and Ro, T. (2008).
Neural substrates of sound-touch
synesthesia after a thalamic lesion.
J. Neurosci. 28, 13696–13702. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3872-08.2008
Beeli, G., Esslen, M., and Jancke,
L. (2005). Synaesthesia - When
coloured sounds taste sweet. Nature
434, 38. doi: 10.1038/434038a
Bocanegra, B. R., and Zeelenberg,
R. (2009). Emotion improves and
impairs early vision. Psychol. Sci.
20, 707–713. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2009.02354.x
Bors, E. (1979). Extinction and synes-
thesia in patients with spinal-cord
injuries. Paraplegia 17, 21–31. doi:
10.1038/sc.1979.9
Bradley, M. M., and Lang, P. J. (2000).
“Measuring emotion: behavior, feel-
ing, and physiology,” in Cognitive
Neuroscience of Emotion. Series in
Affective Science, eds R. D. Lane and
L. Nadel (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press), 242–276.
Bradshaw, J. L. (2001). Allodynia: a
sensory analogue of motor mirror
neurons in a hyperaesthetic patient
reporting instantaneous discomfort
to another’s perceived sudden
minor injury. J. Neurol. Neurosurg.
Psychiatry 70, 135A–136A. doi:
10.1136/jnnp.70.1.135a
Brunyé, T. T., Mahoney, C. R.,
Augustyn, J. S., and Taylor, H.
A. (2009). Emotional state and
local versus global spatial memory.
Acta Psychol. 130, 138–146. doi:
10.1016/j.actpsy.2008.11.002
Cacioppo, J. T., Berntson, G. G.,
Larsen, J. T., Poehlmann, K. M.,
and Ito, T. A. (2000). “The psy-
chophysiology of emotion,” in The
Handbook of Emotion, 2nd Edn., eds
R. Lewis and J. M. Haviland-Jones
(New York, NY: Guilford Press),
173–191.
Callejas, A., Acosta, A., and Lupianez,
J. (2007). Green love is ugly:
emotions elicited by synesthetic
grapheme-color perceptions.
Brain Res. 1127, 99–107. doi:
10.1016/j.brainres.2006.10.013
Cannon, W. B. (1929). Bodily Changes
in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage.
2nd Edn. New York, NY: Appleton-
Century.
Chen, D., and Dalton, P. (2005).
The effect of emotion and per-
sonality on olfactory perception.
Chem. Senses 30, 345–351. doi:
10.1093/chemse/bji029
Cohen Kadosh, R., and Terhune, D.
B. (2012). Redefining synaesthe-
sia. Br. J. Psychol. 103, 20–23.
doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.2010.
02003.x
Collier, G. L. (1996). Affective synes-
thesia: extracting emotion space
from simple perceptual stim-
uli. Motiv. Emot. 20, 1–32. doi:
10.1007/BF02251005
Collier, W. G., and Hubbard, T.
L. (2004). Musical scales and
brightness evaluations: effects
of pitch, direction, and scale
mode. Music Sci. 8, 151–173. doi:
10.1177/102986490400800203
Curby, K. M., Johnson, K. J., and
Tyson, A. (2011). Face to face
with emotion: holistic face pro-
cessing is modulated by emotional
state. Cogn. Emot. 25, 93–102. doi:
10.1080/02699931.2011.555752
Cutsforth, T. D. (1925). The role
of emotion in a synaesthetic sub-
ject. Am. J. Psychol. 36, 527. doi:
10.2307/1413908
Cytowic, R. E. (2002). Synesthesia: A
Union of the Senses. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Cytowic, R. E. (1989). Synesthesia: A
Union of the Senses. New York, NY:
Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4612-
3542-2
D’Andrade, R., and Egan, M. (1974).
The colors of emotion. Am. Ethnol.
1, 49–63.
Dael, N., Goudbeek,M., and Scherer, K.
R. (2013). Perceived gesture dynam-
ics in nonverbal expression of emo-
tion. Perception 42, 642–657. doi:
10.1068/p7364
Day, S. A. (2005). “Some demographic
and socio-cultural aspects of synes-
thesia,” in Synesthesia: Perspectives
from Cognitive Neuroscience,
eds L. Robertson and N. Sagiv
(Oxford: Oxford University Press),
11–33.
Deroy, O., and Spence, C. (2013). Why
we are not all synesthetes (not even
weakly so). Psychon. Bull. Rev. 20,
643–664. doi: 10.3758/s13423-013-
0387-2
Dittrich, W. H., Troscianko, T., Lea,
S. E., and Morgan, D. (1996).
Perception of emotion from
dynamic point-light displays rep-
resented in dance. Perception 25,
727–738. doi: 10.1068/p250727
Dixon, M. J., Smilek, D., Cudahy, C.,
and Merikle, P. M. (2000). Five plus
two equals yellow. Nature 406, 365.
doi: 10.1038/35019148
Dixon, M. J., Smilek, D., and Merikle,
P. M. (2004). Not all synaesthetes
are created equal: projector versus
associator synaesthetes. Cogn. Affect.
Behav. Neurosci. 4, 335–343. doi:
10.3758/CABN.4.3.335
Dudycha, G. J., and Dudycha, M.
M. (1935). A case of synesthe-
sia visual-pain and visual-audition.
J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol. 30, 57–69.
doi: 10.1037/h0060678
Emrich, H. M., Schneider, U., and
Zedler, M. (2004). Welche Farbe hat
der Montag? Synästhesie: Das Leben
mit Verknüpften Sinnen. Stuggart:
Hirzel-Verlag.
Ekman, P. (1992). An argu-
ment for basic emotions.
Cogn. Emot. 6, 169–200. doi:
10.1080/02699939208411068
Ekman, P. (1999). “Basic emotions,” in
Handbook of Cognition and Emotion,
eds T. Dalgleish and M. J. Power
(Chichester: John Wiley and Sons),
45–60.
Ferraro, F. R., King, B., Ronning,
B., Pekarski, K., and Risan, J.
(2003). Effects of induced emo-
tional state on lexical processing
in younger and older adults.
J. Psychol. 137, 262–272. doi:
10.1080/00223980309600613
Fetterman, A. K., Robinson, M. D., and
Meier, B. P. (2012). Anger as “seeing
red”: evidence for a perceptual asso-
ciation. Cogn. Emot. 26, 1445–1458.
doi: 10.1080/02699931.2012.673477
Fitzgibbon, B. M., Giummarra,
M. J., Georgiou-Karistianis, N.,
Enticott, P. G., and Bradshaw,
J. L. (2010). Shared pain: from
empathy to synaesthesia. Neurosci.
Biobehav. Rev. 34, 500–512. doi:
10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.10.007
Flournoy, T. (1892). L’Audition coloree.
Arch. Sci. Phys. Nat. 28, 505–508.
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 754 | 7
Dael et al. Affect-related synesthesias
Fontaine, J. R. J., Scherer, K. R.,
Roesch, E. B., and Ellsworth, P. C.
(2007). The world of emotions is
not two-dimensional. Psychol. Sci.
18, 1050–1057. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.02024.x
Forsman, L. (1993). Giving extreme
responses to items in self-esteem
scales: response set or personality
trait. Eur. J. Psychol. Assess. 9, 33–40.
Gable, P., and Harmon-Jones, E.
(2010). The blues broaden, but
the nasty narrows: attentional
consequences of negative affects low
and high in motivational intensity.
Psychol. Sci. 21, 211–215. doi:
10.1177/0956797609359622
Gagnon, K. T., Geuss, M. N., and
Stefanucci, J. K. (2013). Fear
influences perceived reaching to
targets in audition, but not vision.
Evol. Hum. Behav. 34, 49–54.
doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.
2012.09.002
Galton, F. (1880). Visualised numer-
als. Nature 22, 494–495. doi:
10.1038/021494e0
Giummarra, M. J., and Bradshaw, J.
L. (2009). “Synaesthesia for pain:
feeling pain with another,” in
Mirror Neuron Systems, ed J. A.
Pineda (New York, NY: Humana
Press), 287–307. doi: 10.1007/978-
1-59745-479-7_13
Grossenbacher, P. G., and Lovelace,
C. T. (2001). Mechanisms of
synesthesia: cognitive and phys-
iological constraints. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 5, 36–41. doi:
10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01571-0
Grossenbacher, P. G. (1997).
“Perception and sensory infor-
mation in synesthaetic experience,”
in Synaesthesia; Classic and
Contemporary Readings, eds S.
Baron-Cohen and J. Harrison
(Oxford: Blackwell), 148–172.
Harrison, J. E., and Baron-Cohen,
S. (1997). “An introduction,”
in Synaesthesia; Classic and
Contemporary Readings, eds S.
Baron-Cohen and J. E. Harrison
(Oxford: Blackwell), 3–16.
Hochel, M., Milan, E. G., Martin, J.
L. M., Gonzalez, A., Garcia, E. D.,
Tornay, F., et al. (2009). Congruence
or coherence. Emotional and
physiological responses to
colours in synaesthesia. Eur. J.
Cogn. Psychol. 21, 703–723. doi:
10.1080/09541440802176292
Hubbard, E. M., and Ramachandran,
V. S. (2001). Cross wiring and the
neural basis of synesthesia. Invest.
Ophthalmol. Vis. Sci. 42, S712–S712.
Hupka, R. B., Zaleski, Z., Otto, J., Reidl,
L., and Tarabrina, N. V. (1997).
The colors of anger, envy, fear, and
jealousy—A cross-cultural study.
J. Cross. Cult. Psychol. 28, 156–171.
doi: 10.1177/0022022197282002
James, W. (1890). The Principles of
Psychology. New York, NY: Dover.
doi: 10.1037/11059-000
Jewanski, J., Day, S. A., and Ward, J.
(2009). A colorful albino: the first
documented case of synaesthesia, by
Georg Tobias Ludwig Sachs in 1812.
J. Hist. Neurosci. 18, 293–303. doi:
10.1080/09647040802431946
Johnson, A., Johnson, O., and Baksh,
M. (1986). The colors of emo-
tions in Machiguenga. Am.
Anthropol. 88, 674–681. doi:
10.1525/aa.1986.88.3.02a00110
Kreibig, S. D. (2010). Autonomic
nervous system activity in emo-
tion: a review. Biol. Psychol. 84,
394–421. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.
2010.03.010
Larson, C. L., Aronoff, J., and Steuer, E.
L. (2012). Simple geometric shapes
are implicitly associated with affec-
tive value.Motiv. Emot. 36, 404–413.
doi: 10.1007/s11031-011-9249-2
Lindsen, J. P., and Bhattacharya, J.
(2012). “How music can brighten
our world: emotions induced by
music affect brightness percep-
tion,” in Proceedings of the 12th
International Conference on Music
Perception and Cognition and the 8th
Triennial Conference of the European
Society for the Cognitive Sciences
of Music, eds E. Cambouropoulos,
C. Tsougras, P. Mavromatis,
and K. Pastiadis (Thessaloniki),
604–605.
Logsdail, S. (2009). A patient’s jour-
ney synaesthesia. Br. Med. J.
339, 261–262. doi: 10.1136/
bmj.b3191
Lundqvist, D., Esteves, F., and Ohman,
A. (1999). The face of wrath: crit-
ical features for conveying facial
threat. Cogn. Emot. 13, 691–711.
doi: 10.1080/026999399379041
Lynn, S. K., Zhang, X., and Barrett,
L. F. (2012). Affective state influ-
ences perception by affecting deci-
sion parameters underlying bias and
sensitivity. Emotion 12, 726–736.
doi: 10.1037/a0026765
Mahling, F. (1926). Das Problem der
“Audition colorée.” Arch. Gesamte
Psychol. 57, 165–302.
Marks, L. E. (1975). Synesthesia—the
lucky people with mixed-up senses.
Psychol. Today 9, 48–52.
Martino, G., and Marks, L. E. (2001).
Synesthesia: strong and weak. Curr.
Dir. Psychol. Sci. 10, 61–65. doi:
10.1111/1467-8721.00116
Meier, B. P., Robinson, M. D.,
Crawford, L. E., and Ahlvers, W. J.
(2007). When “light” and “dark”
thoughts become light and dark
responses: affect biases brightness
judgments. Emotion 7, 366–376.
doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.7.2.366
Moors, A. (2009). Theories of
emotion causation: a review.
Cogn. Emot. 23, 625–662. doi:
10.1080/02699930802645739
Mroczko, A., Metzinger, T., Singer,
W., and Nikolic, D. (2009).
Immediate transfer of synes-
thesia to a novel inducer. J. Vis. 9,
1–8. doi: 10.1167/9.12.25
Mulligan, K., and Scherer, K. R. (2012).
Toward a working definition of
emotion. Emot. Rev. 4, 345–357. doi:
10.1177/1754073912445818
Niedenthal, P. M., and Setterlund,
M. B. (1997). Being happy and
seeing happy: emotional state
mediates visual word recognition.
Cogn. Emot. 11, 403–432. doi:
10.1080/026999397379863
Ohman, A., and Mineka, S. (2001).
Fears, phobias, and preparedness:
toward an evolved module of fear
and fear learning. Psychol. Rev.
108, 483–522. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.108.3.483
Palmer, S. E., and Schloss, K. B.
(2010). An ecological valence
theory of human color prefer-
ence. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
107, 8877–8882. doi: 10.1073/
pnas.0906172107
Palmer, S. E., Schloss, K. B., and
Sammartino, J. (2013a). Visual
aesthetics and human preference.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 64, 77–107. doi:
10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-
100504
Palmer, S. E., Schloss, K. B., Xu, Z.,
and Prado-León, L. R. (2013b).
Music—color associations are
mediated by emotion. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 110, 8836–8841.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1212562110
Phelps, E. A., Ling, S., and Carrasco, M.
(2006). Emotion facilitates percep-
tion and potentiates the perceptual
benefits of attention. Psychol. Sci.
17, 292–299. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2006.01701.x
Podoll, K., and Robinson, D. (2002).
Auditory-visual synaesthesia in
a patient with basilar migraine.
J. Neurol. 249, 476–477. doi:
10.1007/s004150200042
Pollatos, O., Kopietz, R., Linn, J.,
Albrecht, J., Sakar, V., Anzinger,
A., et al. (2007). Emotional
stimulation alters olfactory
sensitivity and odor judgment.
Chem. Senses 32, 583–589. doi:
10.1093/chemse/bjm027
Pollick, F. E., Paterson, H. M.,
Bruderlin, A., and Sanford,
A. J. (2001). Perceiving
affect from arm movement.
Cognition 82, B51–B61. doi:
10.1016/S0010-0277(01)00147-0
Price, M. C., and Mentzoni, R.
A. (2008). Where is January.
The month-SNARC effect
in sequence-form synaes-
thetes. Cortex 44, 890–907. doi:
10.1016/j.cortex.2006.10.003
Ramachandran, V. S., and Brang, D.
(2008). Tactile-emotion synesthe-
sia. Neurocase 14, 390–399. doi:
10.1080/13554790802363746
Ramachandran, V. S., and Hubbard,
E. M. (2001a). Psychophysical
investigations into the neu-
ral basis of synaesthesia. Proc.
Biol. Sci. 268, 979–983. doi:
10.1098/rspb.2000.1576
Ramachandran, V. S., and Hubbard, E.
M. (2001b). Synaesthesia—A win-
dow into perception, thought and
language. J. Conscious. Stud. 8, 3–34.
Ramachandran, V. S., Miller, L.,
Livingstone, M. S., and Brang,
D. (2012). Colored halos around
faces and emotion-evoked col-
ors: a new form of synesthesia.
Neurocase 18, 352–358. doi:
10.1080/13554794.2011.608366
Rich, A. N., Bradshaw, J. L., and
Mattingley, J. B. (2005). A system-
atic, large-scale study of synaesthe-
sia: implications for the role of early
experience in lexical-colour asso-
ciations. Cognition 98, 53–84. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2004.11.003
Rich, A. N., andMattingley, J. B. (2002).
Anomalous perception in synaes-
thesia: a cognitive neuroscience per-
spective. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 3,
43–52. doi: 10.1038/nrn702
Riggs, L. A., and Karwoski, T. (1934).
Synaesthesia. Br. J. Psychol. 25,
29–41.
Ro, T., Farne, A., Johnson, R. M.,
Wedeen, V., Chu, Z. L., Wang, Z. Y.
J., et al. (2007). Feeling sounds after
a thalamic lesion. Ann. Neurol. 62,
433–441. doi: 10.1002/ana.21219
Rogowska, A. (2011). Categorization of
synaesthesia. Rev. Gen. Psychol. 15,
213–227. doi: 10.1037/a0024078
Roseman, I. J., and Smith, C. A.
(2001). “Appraisal theory: overview,
assumptions, varieties, contro-
versies,” in Appraisal Processes in
Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research,
eds K. R. Scherer and A. Schorr
(New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 3–19.
Rossi, V., and Pourtois, G. (2013).
Negative affective state mimics
effects of perceptual load on spatial
perception. Emotion 13, 485–496.
doi: 10.1037/a0030697
Rothen, N., and Meier, B. (2009). Do
synesthetes have a general advantage
in visual search and episodic mem-
ory. A case for group studies. PLoS
ONE 4:e5037. doi: 10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0005037
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 754 | 8
Dael et al. Affect-related synesthesias
Rouw, R., and Scholte, H. S. (2007).
Increased structural connectivity
in grapheme-color synesthesia.
Nat. Neurosci. 10, 792–797. doi:
10.1038/nn1906
Rouw, R., and Scholte, H. S. (2010).
Neural basis of individual differ-
ences in synesthetic experiences.
J. Neurosci. 30, 6205–6213. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3444-09.2010
Sagiv, N., and Ward, J. (2006).
Crossmodal interactions:
lessons from synesthesia. Prog.
Brain Res. 155, 259–271. doi:
10.1016/S0079-6123(06)55015-0
Schachter, S. (1964). “The interaction
of cognitive and physiological
determinants of emotional state,”
in Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology, ed L. Berkowitz
(New York, NY: Academic Press),
49–80.
Scherer, K. R. (2005). What are emo-
tions. And how can they be mea-
sured? Soc. Sci. Inform. 44, 695–729.
doi: 10.1177/0539018405058216
Scherer, K. R. (2001). “Appraisal
considered as a process of mul-
tilevel sequential checking,” in
Appraisal Processes in Emotion:
Theory, Methods, Research, eds K. R.
Scherer, A. Schorr, and T. Johnstone
(New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 92–120.
Schmitz, T. W., De Rosa, E., and
Anderson, A. K. (2009). Opposing
influences of affective state valence
on visual cortical encoding.
J. Neurosci. 29, 7199–7207. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5387-08.2009
Siebert, D. J. (1994). Salvia divi-
norum and salvinorin A:
new pharmacologic findings.
J. Ethnopharmacol. 43, 53–56. doi:
10.1016/0378-8741(94)90116-3
Siegel, E. H., and Stefanucci, J. K.
(2011). A little bit louder now: neg-
ative affect increases perceived loud-
ness. Emotion 11, 1006–1011. doi:
10.1037/a0024590
Simner, J. (2007). Beyond per-
ception: synaesthesia as a
psycholinguistic phenomenon.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 23–29. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2006.10.010
Simner, J. (2012). Defining synaes-
thesia: a response to two excel-
lent commentaries. Br. J. Psychol.
103, 24–27. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-
8295.2011.02059.x
Simner, J., Harrold, J., Creed, H.,
Monro, L., and Foulkes, L. (2009).
Early detection of markers for
synaesthesia in childhood pop-
ulations. Brain 132, 57–64. doi:
10.1093/brain/awn292
Simner, J., and Holenstein, E. (2007).
Ordinal linguistic personifica-
tion as a variant of synesthesia.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19, 694–703. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2007.19.4.694
Simner, J., Hung, W.-Y., and Shillcock,
R. (2011). Synaesthesia in a
logographic language: the
colouring of Chinese characters
and Pinyin/Bopomo spellings.
Conscious. Cogn. 20, 1376–1392.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.05.006
Simner, J., Mulvenna, C., Sagiv,
N., Tsakanikos, E., Witherby,
S. A., Fraser, C., et al. (2006).
Synaesthesia: the prevalence of
atypical cross-modal experiences.
Perception 35, 1024–1033. doi:
10.1068/p5469
Sinke, C., Halpern, J. H., Zedler, M.,
Neufeld, J., Emrich, H. M., and
Passie, T. (2012). Genuine and drug-
induced synesthesia: a comparison.
Conscious. Cogn. 21, 1419–1434.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.03.009
Skelton, R., Ludwig, C., and Mohr,
C. (2009). A novel, illustrated
questionnaire to distinguish
projector and associator synaes-
thetes. Cortex 45, 721–729. doi:
10.1016/j.cortex.2008.02.006
Smilek, D., Callejas, A., Dixon, M.
J., and Merikle, P. M. (2010).
Ovals of time: time-space
associations in synaesthesia.
Conscious. Cogn. 16, 507–519. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2009.09.008
Smilek, D., Dixon, M. J., Cudahy,
C., and Merikle, P. M. (2001).
Synesthetic photisms influ-
ence visual perception. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 13, 930–936. doi:
10.1162/089892901753165845
Smilek, D., Malcolmson, K. A.,
Carriere, J. S. A., Eller, M., Kwan,
D., and Reynolds, M. (2007). When
“3” is a jerk and “T” is a king:
personifying inanimate objects in
synesthesia. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19,
981–992. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2007.
19.6.981
Song, H., Vonasch, A. J., Meier, B. P.,
and Bargh, J. A. (2012). Brighten
up: smiles facilitate perceptual
judgment of facial lightness. J. Exp.
Soc. Psychol. 48, 450–452. doi:
10.1016/j.jesp.2011.10.003
Stefanucci, J. K., Gagnon, K. T., and
Lessard, D. A. (2011). Follow
your heart: emotion adaptively
influences perception. Soc. Pers.
Psychol. Compass 5, 296–308. doi:
10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00352.x
Stefanucci, J. K., Proffitt, D. R., Clore,
G. L., and Parekh, N. (2008).
Skating down a steeper slope:
fear influences the perception of
geographical slant. Perception
37, 321–323. doi: 10.1068/
p5796
Stefanucci, J. K., and Storbeck, J.
(2009). Don’t look down: emotional
arousal elevates height perception.
J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 138, 131–145.
doi: 10.1037/a0014797
Stevenson, R. J., Boakes, R. A., and
Prescott, J. (1998). Changes in
odor sweetness resulting from
implicit learning of a simultaneous
odor-sweetness association: an
example of learned synesthesia.
Learn. Motiv. 29, 113–132. doi:
10.1006/lmot.1998.0996
Terhune, D. B., Cardeña, E., and
Lindgren, M. (2010). Disruption
of synaesthesia by posthyp-




Tyler, C. W. (2005). “Varieties
of synesthetic experience,” in
Synesthesia: Perspectives from
Cognitive Neuroscience, eds L.
Robertson and N. Sagiv (Oxford:
Oxford University Press), 34–44.
Valdez, P., and Mehrabian, A. (1994).
Effects of color on emotions.
J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 123, 394. doi:
10.1037/0096-3445.123.4.394
Van Meel, J. M. (1994). Representing
emotions in literature and paint-
ings: a comparative analysis. Poetics
23, 159–176. doi: 10.1016/0304-
422X(94)00013-V
Visch, V. T., and Tan, E. S. (2009).
Categorizing moving objects into
film genres: the effect of animacy
attribution, emotional response,
and the deviation from non-fiction.
Cognition 110, 265–272. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2008.10.018
Ward, J. (2004). Emotionally
mediated synaesthesia. Cogn.
Neuropsychol. 21, 761–772. doi:
10.1080/02643290342000393
Ward, J., Huckstep, B., and Tsakanikos,
E. (2006). Sound-colour synaes-
thesia: to what extent does it
use cross-modal mechanisms
common to us all. Cortex 42,
264–280. doi: 10.1016/S0010-9452
(08)70352-6
Ward, J., and Simner, J. (2003).
Lexical-gustatory synaesthesia:
linguistic and conceptual fac-
tors. Cognition 89, 237–261. doi:
10.1016/S0010-0277(03)00122-7
Ward, J., and Simner, J. (2005). Is
synaesthesia an X-linked domi-
nant trait with lethality in males.
Perception 34, 611–623. doi:
10.1068/p5250
Ward, J. (2013). Synesthesia. Annu. Rev.
Psychol. 64, 49–75. doi: 10.1146/
annurev-psych-113011-143840
Witthoft, N., and Winawer, J.
(2006). Synesthetic colors
determined by having colored
refrigerator magnets in child-
hood. Cortex 42, 175–183. doi:
10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70342-3
Yaro, C., andWard, J. (2007). Searching
for shereshevskii: What is superior
about the memory of synaes-
thetes. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 60,
681–695. doi: 10.1080/1747021060
0785208
Yasuda, M., Webster, S., and Webster,
M. (2007). Color and facial expres-
sions. J. Vis. 7, 946–946. doi:
10.1167/7.9.946
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 06 July 2013; accepted: 27
September 2013; published online: 18
October 2013.
Citation: Dael N, Sierro G and Mohr
C (2013) Affect-related synesthesias:
a prospective view on their existence,
expression and underlying mechanisms.
Front. Psychol. 4:754. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2013.00754
This article was submitted to Cognitive
Science, a section of the journal Frontiers
in Psychology.
Copyright © 2013 Dael, Sierro and
Mohr. This is an open-access article dis-
tributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction
in other forums is permitted, provided
the original author(s) or licensor are
credited and that the original publica-
tion in this journal is cited, in accor-
dance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with
these terms.
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 754 | 9
